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Previous research suggests that members of East Asian cultures 
show a greater risk preference in financial domains than do members of 
Western Cultures.  Hsee and Weber (1998; 1999) suggest that this 
difference in risk preference is rooted in subjective size of social network 
(SSSN) cross cultures.  There are some important limitations to this single 
variable model.  I explored the role of SSSN and another candidate 
variable, fear of negative evaluation (FNE).  Previous research suggests 
that individual differences in social variables (e.g., FNE or interdependence) 
may explain group differences in cognitive performances.  I manipulated 
both FNE and SSSN in a group of college students and measured their risk 
preference and used a task that separately assessed the individual 
  vii
relationships between the manipulated factors and the processes of risk 
taking.  The results of Experiment indicate that both SSSN and FNE 
influence risk preference but in different ways.  FNE influences perceived-
risk, which in turn affects willingness to pay (WTP) and choice.  In 
contrast, SSSN affects WTP and choice directly without being mediated by 
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1 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
There is much interest in cross-cultural studies of risk taking.  A 
number of studies have focused specifically on financial risk taking.  Research 
has shown that members of East Asian cultures are more risk-averse in most 
domains, such as social risk, than are those in Western cultures, but surprisingly 
are more risk-seeking than Westerners for financial risks (Hsee & Weber, 
1999).  Hsee and Weber (1999) suggested that the difference in risk preference 
is rooted in cultural differences in people’s subjective size of social network 
(henceforth, SSSN).  In this dissertation, I examine the determinants of this 
cross-cultural difference in risk-aversion more carefully.  First, I briefly 
review the individual processes in risk taking and the existing explanations of 
the cross-cultural difference.  Then, I discuss some important limitations of the 
previous work.  I introduce a new variable, fear of negative evaluation 
(henceforth, FNE) that may contribute to the cultural difference.  Then I 
examine my multi-variable model of cross-cultural differences in financial risk 
taking in Experiment, which includes SSSN and FNE. 
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2 Chapter 2  
As discussed, previous research suggested that East Asians are less risk-
averse than are Americans specifically for financial decisions and that the social 
network serves as a “cushion” that protects people if they take risks (Hsee & 
Weber, 1999).  However, figuring out the relationship between a factor and 
risk taking is not a simple task.  Some variables may directly influence risk 
perception itself and the others may be related to risk attitude or wiliness to pay 
(Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998).  For this reason, I must first examine the 
determinants of risk taking. 
2.1 Components in risk taking: risk perception, 
attitude, and WTP 
In risk preference, risk perception is a primitive and a risky choice 
depends on both the perceived riskiness and the value of a risky option 
(Markowitz, 1959).  Specifically, people's willingness to pay (WTP) for risky 
option X is conceptualized as a compromise between the option's return or 
value (V) and its risk (R) and it is assumed that decision makers seek to 
minimize the risk for a given level of expected return:   
WTP(X) = f (V(X), R(X)) = V(X) – bR((X)  (1) 
Traditional R-V models in finance equate V(X) with the expected value 
of option X and R(X) with its variance, a formalization that is compatible with 
a quadratic utility function for money (Levy & Markowitz, 1979), that is still 
widely used. Recent work (Bell, 1995; Jia & Dyer, 1996) has shown that a 
broad range of utility functions have risk-return interpretations.  Different 
utility functions imply different measures of risk under the assumptions of risk 
aversion and the identification of the return with expected value. These 
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generalized risk-return models allow for the fact that the perception of the 
riskiness of risky options may differ between individuals or groups or may 
differ as a function of the decision context.   
Equation 1 implies that individual or group differences in preference or 
willingness-to-pay for an option can come about in the two ways.  They may 
result either from differences in the perception of the riskiness of option X (i.e., 
from differences in the value of R(X)) or from differences in the risk-value 
tradeoff (i.e., from differences in coefficient b), assuming that perceptions of 
the attractiveness or value of option X (V(X)) do not differ significantly 
between individuals or groups. (see Weber, Anderson, & Birnbaum, 1992 for 
empirical support for that assumption).  Slovic (1964) made essentially the 
same theoretical distinction by describing two reasons for apparent differences 
in risk preference between two groups.   
Risk preference is a label used to describe a person's choice when faced 
with two options that are equal in expected value but differ on a dimension 
assumed to affect the riskiness of options such as the variance (the difference 
between the high and low payoffs) of the outcomes.  Options of the same 
expected value can differ in their variance of the outcomes.  For example, an 
option A has a greater maximum gain and loss (e.g., probability of 0.65 for 
gaining $43 and 0.35 for losing $47) than the other option B (e.g. probability of 
0.65 for gaining $36 and 0.35 for loosing $34).  The option A has a greater 
difference between maximum gain and loss (i.e., higher variance) than does the 
option B but the two have the same expected value (i.e., $11.5).     
Some people may choose a higher-variance option over a lower- 
variance option of equal expected value (i.e., behave as if they were risk-
seeking) because they equate riskiness with variance and have a positive 
attitude towards risk; that is, they truly seek out the option perceived to be 
riskier. Other people who show the same choice pattern may choose the 
presumably riskier option because they have a different subjective impression 
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of the relative risks of the two choice options; for a variety of reasons (which 
may involve aspiration levels for returns) they may perceive the higher-
variance option that they choose to be the less risky of the two options and 
therefore are, in fact, perceived-risk averse.  Recently, empirical evidence has 
been provided for both of these processes. Weber and Milliman (1997) and 
Mellers, Schwartz, and Cooke (1998) show for a variety of decision domains 
(gambling, stock market, and commuting decisions) that within- and between-
subject differences in apparent risk preference may either be the result of 
differences in attitude towards perceived risk (i.e., in the tradeoff coefficient b) 
or of differences in the way risk is perceived and defined (i.e., in R(X)).   
Distinguishing between these two reasons for differences in apparent 
risk preference is important because each reason points to a different and 
distinct locus in the decision process at which individual or group differences 
come into play to influence risky choice.  Each reason also corresponds to a 
distinct psychological mechanism that underlies observed differences in choice, 
preference, or willingness to pay. An understanding of the decision process and 
some knowledge about which component(s) of it may be affected by a decision 
maker's characteristics allow better prediction of people’s reactions to changes 
in the situation or of their preferences in subsequent decisions.   
Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) provide a concrete example for 
the utility of differentiating between group differences in risk perception versus 
group differences in perceived-risk attitude. Contrary to popular myths about 
the risk-taking propensity of entrepreneurs, they found that the factor that 
differentiated entrepreneurs from other managers was not a greater willingness 
to take on risks but, instead, an overly optimistic perception of the risks 
involved in risky choice options.  For an outside observer who perceives risks 
more essentially, it therefore may appear that entrepreneurs have a greater 
propensity to engage in risky ventures.  However, when differences in risk 
perception are factored out, entrepreneurs--just as other managers--have 
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demonstrated a preference for tasks in which the risks are only moderate 
(Brockhaus, 1982).   
However, final manifestations (e.g., WTP and choice) of risk-seeking 
are influenced not only by these two factors but also by other contextual 
variables.  For example, situational/contextual variables have been shown to 
influence WTP and choice but not risk perception (Sokolowska, in 
preparation; Sokolowska & Tyszka, 1995; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).  
In sum, variables influence risk taking in different ways.  Some 
variables may be related to risk perception whereas others influence attitude.  
Some others may directly affect WTP without their influence on risk 
perception or attitude (Mellers et al., 1998).     
2.2 Cushion hypothesis  
According to Hsee and Weber’s (1999) “cushion hypothesis”, members 
of socially collectivist cultures (e.g., China), can afford to take greater financial 
risks because they perceive their social networks to be larger than do 
Westerners, and consequently because they are protected from catastrophic 
outcomes.  The social network serves as a support that protects people if they 
take risks and fail.  Although Hsee and Weber (1999) did not provide a clear 
definition of the size of social network, the social psychology literature defines 
social network as web of social relationships surrounding an individual (Syme 
& Berkman, 1976; Thoits, 1983a, 1983b).  We can distinguish between the 
objective social network, which would be measured by actually counting the 
people connected to an individual and assessing their relationships to him or 
her, and a person’s subjective size of social network, which is his/her 
perception and interpretation of the network (Barrera, 1986).  A consensus 
among researchers is that the subjective size of social network consists mainly 
of the perceived number of members in the network (i.e., size itself) and 
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expectation of social/material/emotional supports from those people.  The 
subjective and objective network sizes are weakly positively correlated with 
each other (Barrera, 1986; Furukawa, Harai, Hirai, Kitamura, & Takahashi, 
1999).   
The cushion hypothesis predicts that there will be more cross-cultural 
risk-preference differences for decisions involving monetary consequences than 
for decisions involving other outcomes, because East Asians’ social networks 
provide more perceived support for financial problems than do the Westerners’ 
social networks.  To test this hypothesis, Hsee and Weber (1999) assessed 
Chinese and Americans’ risk choices in three decision domains; financial, 
academic, and medical.  The financial decision was about whether to invest 
money in a savings account or in stocks.  The academic decision was about 
whether to write a term paper on a conservative topic so that the grade would be 
predictable or to write the paper on a provocative topic so that the grade could 
be either very high or very low.  The medical decision concerned whether to 
take a pain reliever with a moderate but sure effectiveness or a pain reliever 
with a high variance in effectiveness.  They found that the Chinese 
participants were significantly more risk-seeking than were the Americans only 
in the financial decision domain confirming the cushion hypothesis.   
Further, Weber and Hsee suggested that such differences in financial 
risk taking were caused by the difference in WTP, which was assumed to be 
based on the difference in perceived risk between cultures (1998).  They 
observed cultural differences in the pricing of risky options.  They examined 
risk perceptions and attitudes towards perceived risk of respondents from 
China, US, Germany and Poland.  In their study, Chinese respondents were 
significantly less risk-averse in their pricing than were Americans when risk 
preference was assessed in the traditional expected-utility framework.  For 
example, Chinese participants offered significantly greater maximum buying 
prices for each option than did American participants.  They suggested that 
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these apparent differences in risk preference were associated primarily with 
cultural differences in the perception of the risk of the financial options than 
with cultural differences in attitude towards perceived risk.  In all cultures, the 
majority of respondents was willing to pay more for options perceived as less 
risky (i.e., they were perceived-risk averse) (Weber and Hsee, 1998).   
In sum, according to the cushion hypothesis, the observed cross-cultural 
difference in financial risk taking is rooted in the difference in the perceiver risk 
caused by different sizes of social network between cultures.  Figure 2.1 






Figure 2.1: An overview of the cushion hypothesis of cross-cultural 
difference in financial risk preference.  
2.3 Limitations of SSSN as a factor for the explanation 
of cultural/group differences in risk perception 
As described, above, Weber and Hsee (1999; Weber & Hsee, 2000) 
interpreted their results as a support for their cushion hypothesis, suggesting 
that a larger SSSN in the Chinese population led to differences in risk 
perception between members of East Asian (e.g., Chinese) and Western (e.g., 
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American) cultures.  Although these observations are consistent with the 
cushion hypothesis, it is not clear whether the subjective size of social network 
directly influenced risk-perception producing a difference in risk-seeking 
between cultures.  There are reasons to be cautions about deriving this 
conclusion.   
First, there is an empirical gap between the observed cross-cultural 
differences in SSSN and risk perception.  What Hsee and Weber found was 
that (a) Chinese were less risk-averse for the choices of riskier options in the 
financial domain than were Americans and (b) there was a positive relationship 
between SSSN and the choice judgments (Hsee & Weber, 1999).  In another 
study, they found a difference in risk-perception and WTP (not in the attitudes 
towards perceived risk) between the two cultures (Weber & Hsee, 1998).  
Their studies never provided direct evidence for the link between SSSN and 
risk-perception, and these two observations alone are not sufficient to support 
the argument that SSSN causes differences in risk perception which then causes 
differences in risk preference.  Further, if SSSN is a real causal variable, a 
difference in SSSN should reflect a difference in risk perception even within a 
single culture.  Nonetheless, there have been few studies reporting a positive 
relationship within a culture.   
Another important issue is that choice is relatively less sensitive to 
perceived risk than WTP, and variables that influence WTP and choice are 
quite different often leading to notable discrepancies between WTP and choice 
(Schkade & Johnson, 1989).  Therefore, we do not have enough evidence for 
the argument that SSSN is responsible for the observed cross-cultural 
differences in risk perception.  Rather, what Hsee and Weber found were 
individually observed cross-cultural differences in risk perception, WTP, and 
choice judgments, and the probable relationship between SSSN and overall risk 
preference. 
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Second, the notion of social network is poorly defined in the cushion 
hypothesis.  There are many other ways of defining social network such as 
size (number of network members), density (extent to which members are 
connected to each other), boundedness (degree to which networks are defined 
on the basis of traditional group structures), or homogeneity (extent to which 
individuals are similar to each other; Syme & Berkman, 1976; Thoits, 1983a, 
1983b).  Existing evidence for the cushion hypothesis focuses on an extremely 
narrow piece of the broad characteristics of social network as a causal variable 
for the explanation of cross-cultural differences in risk preference.  As 
discussed, in Hsee and Weber’s (1999) study, among the questions on the scale 
for the measurement of SSSN, the only clearly observed difference between 
members of Chinese and American cultures was the number of people who 
could give each respondent financial help.  The relevant question used in the 
study was “How many of those could you approach if you needed financial help 
or material support?”  There were three other questions for the measurement 
of SSSN (e.g., number of friends or relatives and number of people who can 
provide psychological support).  Hsee and Weber (1999) analyzed only the 
relationship between the number of people who can provide material support 
and financial risk-taking.  
Third, it is unclear whether SSSN reflects a chronic cross-cultural 
difference as the cushion hypothesis suggests.  In the studies of the cushion 
hypothesis, it is assumed that SSSN reflects differences between East Asian 
cultures, which are assumed to be collectivist, and Western cultures, which are 
assumed to individualist.  Not surprisingly, different individuals can differ in 
SSSN.  However, studies examining SSSN have demonstrated that SSSN is 
highly sensitive to current situations and contexts (e.g., current income and 
grade in school) rather than to variables that reflect chronic aspects of groups 
(e.g., gender) or cultures (Tanaka, Takai, Kohyama, Fujihara, & Minami, 
1997).  
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In sum, the current model of the cushion hypothesis has limitations both 
in its explanation of the way SSSN influences risk preference and in its 
application of SSSN to cross-cultural difference.  I wish to test the cushion 
hypothesis in a more comprehensive way.  I begin by suggesting an alternative 
model.  This model introduces another variable-fear of negative evaluation 
(FNE)-which has been demonstrated to differ between cultures.  In the model, 
both FNE and SSSN influence risk preference but in a different way.  In the 
Experiment, I test this model by manipulating SSSN and FNE and observing 
their influences on the individual processes in risk preference. 
2.4 A multi-variable model of risk preference: FNE 
and SSSN 
2.4.1 FNE as an individual difference variable and its influence 
on risk perception  
I agree with Hsee and Weber that there are multiple independent 
processes (e.g., risk perception and attitudes towards perceived risk) that affect 
risk preference.  However, I do not agree with their suggestion that cultural 
differences observed in the financial risk domain are mainly due to the 
differences in risk perception.  Furthermore, I do not think that SSSN directly 
influences risk perception.  Instead, I suggest that SSSN is related to other 
aspects of the manifestation of risk preference (e.g., attitude or WTP) and that 
there is another variable that explains the observed difference in risk 
perception.   
Recent studies of aspiration level provide insight into how individual 
difference and situation variables influence risk preference.  Aspiration level, 
as a kind of reference point, is defined as the expected return on a project.  
Studies of aspiration level suggest that people consider available options in 
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terms of their compatibility with aspirations, i.e., the goals, that they want to or 
must achieve (Lopes & Oden, 1998, 1999).  A person’s interpretation of his or 
her aspiration level seems to be related to WTP rather than to risk perception 
itself.  That is risk perception is insensitive to changes in aspirations but risk 
preference is influenced by changes in aspiration level (Lopes and Oden, 1999).  
For example, Sokolowska (in preparation) found that a majority of participants 
made risk-averse choices when there was no conflict between minimizing risk 
and aspirations whereas, when the less risky option failed to meet the target 
return, they did not show clear risk aversion or risk-seeking.   
Research on the impact of individual differences and situational factors 
on risk acceptance provides insight into how those variables independently 
influence risk perception or preference.  Most recently, Weber, Blais, and Betz 
(2002) found that individual differences (e.g., sensation seeking, intolerance for 
ambiguity, gender) influenced risk taking by affecting perception of risk and 
benefits.  However, they also found that situational factors (e.g., the content of 
the decision) influenced the tradeoff between risk and benefits, as suggested by 
the R-V approach.  Sokolowska and Tyszka (1995) found that Poles expressed 
higher acceptance of technological and environmental hazards than did Swedes, 
even though Poles and Swedes trade off dangers and benefits differently, 
presumably because of differences in their economic situation, implying 
differences in wealth level and/or aspirations.   
This approach is based on the idea that variables that can explain 
individual differences are directly related to risk-perception whereas situational 
variables are mainly related to interpretation of the tradeoff between risks and 
benefits (Sokolowska & Tyszka, 1995; Weber et al., 2002).  An individual 
difference variable may be basic, fundamental, and culture-common, and 
should be able to cover variations both within a culture and between cultures.  
Another important reason that candidate variables must be defined specifically 
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is to provide more insight into the causal relationship between the variable and 
the observed differences within/between groups.    
For example, Kim and Markman (2003; 2004) have proposed fear of 
isolation (FOI) as a candidate causal factor for the explanation of the observed 
cultural differences in other types of cognitive tasks in previous studies.  They 
found that level of FOI has a positive relationship with the relative preference 
for dialectical reasoning (Kim & Markman, 2003) and the relative sensitivity to 
contextual vs. target information.  FOI may affect risk preference by affecting 
risk perception rather than other processes in risk preference (e.g., attitude or 
WTP).   
There are a number of reasons to believe FOI will affect risk perception. 
First, there is some noteworthy overlap between the dialectical reasoning 
mode and greater risk preference in East Asian cultures.  Dialectical thinking 
is based on the philosophy of Holistic thinking.  In the main body of the 
philosophy, there is an emphasis on change, a recognition of contradiction and 
the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for the "Middle Way" between 
opposing propositions.  That is “the current worst does not necessarily have 
to be the future worst.” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999)  Furthermore, this dialectical 
reasoning mode has been observed to make decision makers less likely to be 
sensitive to uncertainty (i.e., probability) producing a greater overconfidence 
and a more risk taking in uncertain (i.e., risky) situations in Asian cultures 
than in Western cultures (for further discussion, see Peng, 2001).  In my 
previous research (Kim & Markman, 2004; Kim & Markman, 2003), higher 
levels of FOI were associated with a greater relative preference for dialectical 
reasoning within a single culture.  Taken together, chronic level of FOI as a 
social anxiety variable reflects the relative preference for dialectical reasoning, 
which has more risk-seeking advices in its philosophy.  
Nonetheless, more risk-seeking caused by a greater preference for the 
dialectical reasoning mode is not sufficient evidence for the relationship 
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between FOI and risk perception.  A more direct support for the relationship 
comes from previous research suggesting that both cultural differences and 
differences in FOI can lead to differences in the relative sensitivity to context 
vs. target information (Kim & Markman, 2004; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).   
This finding has a relationship with the previous studies demonstrating the 
relationship between loci of attention and risk perception (Lopes, 1984, 1987; 
Xie & Wang, 2003).  As discussed, according to the risk-value (R-V) model, a 
risky choice depends on both the riskiness and the value of a risky option.  
Importantly, in the model, risk is treated as primitive (i.e., target) whereas the 
value is assumed to be related to contextual/situational information, e.g., 
aspiration level, (Lopes, 1984, 1987; Xie & Wang, 2003).  Note that riskiness 
is related mainly to the possible loss and its probability whereas value of the 
risky option includes the amount of possible gain (Sokolowska & Pohorille, 
2000).  Obviously, any distribution of attention from the riskiness to the value 
should make a decision maker less sensitive to riskiness itself and, therefore, 
less risk-averse.  
In this dissertation, I used fear of negative evaluation (FNE) as a more 
specific form of anxiety than FOI.  This change from my previous work was 
made to strengthen the relationship between the manipulation and 
measurement.  Fear of negative evaluation is consistent with (but a more 
specific construct than) FOI in that both of these factors represent a person’s 
social concern and sensitivity to relationships with others.  It is defined as 
apprehension about others’ evaluations, distress over their negative evaluations, 
and the expectation that others would evaluate oneself negatively (Watson & 
Friend, 1969).  Because there is no well-constructed measurement scale for 
FOI, previous studies have used the fear of negative evaluation scale as a 
measurement of FOI (e.g., Kim & Markman, 2003; 2004; Shoemaker, Breen, & 
Stamper, 2000).  Thus, there is some question whether the observed 
differences in behavior were caused by manipulated FOI or only the influence 
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of the manipulation on FNE, which was measured on the scale.  Admittedly, 
there are components of FOI other than fear of negative evaluation.  In this 
study, FNE is manipulated and measured.   
In sum, factors that causally explain differences in risk perception 
between different cultures should be basic and fundamental human traits and 
should reflect individual differences within a culture.  They should be 
discriminated from one’s interpretation of situation or context.  FNE has some 
characteristics that make it a good candidate explanatory variable.  I suggest 
that dialectical reasoning and relatively greater sensitivity to situational vs. 
target information primed by FNE influence risk perception.  Nonetheless, it is 
unlikely that SSSN has no relationship with the observed differences in risk 
taking between cultures.  Instead, I suggest that the locus in the causal chain in 
which SSSN influences risk-taking is not as the previous studies suggested.  
Instead, SSSN may be a situational factor.  Then it may be related to attitudes 
towards perceived risk or directly to willingness to pay (WTP) or choice.   
2.4.2 A multi-variable model of risk preference 
I propose a model in which cultural differences in risk taking depend on 
both differences in risk perception and other processes (see Figure 2.2).  As 
discussed, previous research explaining cross-cultural differences focused on 
the influence of a single variable (e.g., SSSN or interdependence vs. 
independence) on risk perception.  It is unlikely that situational variables, 
which influence attitude or aspiration level, are homogeneous in level between 
cultures.  On this view, SSSN influences risk-value tradeoff as an 
interpretation of situations rather than influencing risk perception itself.  As 
discussed, FNE has been suggested as a causal variable that explains some 
observed differences between East Asian and Western cultures because of its 
influence on perception of context and relations among components (Kim and 
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Markman, 2003; 2004).  I suggest that FNE directly influences risk 















Figure 2.2: An overview of the proposed model of cross-cultural difference in 
financial risk preference  
 
There are some important discrepancies between this model and Hsee 
and Weber’s cushion hypothesis.  First, according to the cushion hypothesis 
(Hsee & Weber, 1999; Weber & Hsee, 1998), greater risk preference in WTP 
and choice are rooted in a smaller perceived risk caused by a larger subjective 
size of social network, more specifically, one’s expectation of financial support 
from the network.  However, in my model, a greater risk preference is caused 
by an indirect influence of FNE though its direct effect on risk perception as 
well as direct influences of SSSN on WTP and choice.  Second, the model 
suggests that there could be a difference in the ways in which SSSN influences 
WTP and choice.  As discussed, dissociations between WTP and choice have 
frequently been observed in previous studies (e.g., Schkade & Johnson, 1989).  
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For example, one’s aspiration level influences choice judgments with multiple 
options rather than WTP.  This finding results because choice is relatively less 
sensitive to perceived risk than WTP, and variables that influence WTP and 
choice are quite different often making notable discrepancies between WTP and 
choice (e.g., Schkade & Johnson, 1989).  However, studies of the cushion 
hypothesis have consistently found cross-cultural differences both in WTP and 
choice.  As discussed, SSSN has a few important sub-components that are 
weakly correlated with each other such as network size and social support 
(Barrera, 1986).  Therefore, if SSSN truly influences both WTP and choice, it 
is possible that multiple sub-components in SSSN are related to the 
observations. Indeed, SSSN is quite a broad variable, which includes various 
sub-components.  Some of them may influence WTP whereas choice may be 
sensitive to others.  This issue was not addressed in previous studies of the 
cushion hypothesis.  In the present study, more sub-components in SSSN are 
measured and I examined their individual relationships to each aspect of risk 
preference.   
Three pilot studies were performed first to demonstrate the influence of 
fear of negative evaluation and subjective size of social network by using the 
choice options from Hsee and Weber’s (1999) study, in which participants were 
asked to choose between, for example, either of a sure gain or a risky option.  
In their study, each risky option had a chance of 50% to gain larger than the 
sure option and another chance of 50% to gain nothing.  The loss domain was 
structured similarly.  Within a culture, inducing a higher level of FNE both in 
American and Korean college students made them more risk-seeking in the 
Loss domain.  In contrast, manipulation of SSSN showed a consistent effect in 
the Gain domain.  However, there were no observed differences in risk 
preference and SSSN between participants of the two countries.  These results 
suggest that SSSN may not be sufficient to explain the cross-cultural 
differences in risk preference. Further, the cushion hypothesis cannot explain 
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the observations, because the cushion hypothesis predicts an effect of SSSN 
regardless of the domain. 
This domain difference is important because it may provide insight into 
the differences in the influence of FNE and SSSN on risk preference.  The 
options used in the pilot studies and Hsee and Weber’s (1999) study were pure 
gain and pure loss situations.  As discussed, higher levels of FNE may 
decrease perceived risk in both domains and, consequently, may lead to greater 
risk preference in the loss domain.  In contrast, in the gain domain, SSSN 
might be a stronger determinant of participants’ judgments than risk perception, 
weakening the effect of FNE.   
Previous research in risk acceptance supports this idea.  Sokolowska 
and Pohorille (2000) suggest that risk is a linear combination of three basic 
dimensions of a risky situation: the amount of the loss, the probability of loss, 
and the amount of the gain.  It is assumed that psychological transformations 
are made on these dimensions.  According to the model of acceptance, risk 
acceptance is judged by making a trade-off between perceived risk and the 
amount of the gain.  This idea can be applied to the current pilot studies.  The 
pure loss domain (i.e., sure loss vs. gamble) is related to perceived risk rather 
than to amount of gain whereas the pure gain domain is related mainly to 
amount of the gain.  That is, perceived risk was the main variable influencing 
participants’ judgments in the loss domain in the pilot studies.  As discussed, I 
assume that FNE is related to risk perception.  And it was the case in pilot 
studies that High FNE group was more risk-seeking in the pure loss domain 
than was the Low FNE group.   
In contrast, when choosing between a sure gain and a gamble in the pure 
gain domain, decision makers should be sensitive mainly to the amount of the 
gain (Sokolowska & Pohorille, 2000).  In the pilot studies, the larger SSSN 
group was more likely to be risk-seeking for the larger gain than was the small 
SSSN group.  Obviously, larger subjective size of social network is closely 
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related not only to greater expectation of social support but also to a larger 
desired size of outcome (i.e., expenditure).  More importantly, note that SSSN 
was not a predictor of participants’ judgments in the pure loss domain, in which 
perceived risk was the main factor.  This analysis suggests that SSSN is 
related to other processes of risk preference rather than to risk perception.   
In sum, the pilot study showed that both FNE and SSSN have positive 
influences on risk preference.  More importantly, an implication from the 
results is that FNE influences risk perception whereas SSSN is related to other 
process in risk preference.  As discussed, previous studies in risk taking 
suggest that variables that can explain individual differences are directly related 
to risk-perception whereas situational variables are mainly related to other 
processes in risk preference (Sokolowska & Tyszka, 1995; Weber et al., 2002).  
Taken together, I suggest that FNE, as an individual difference variable, 
influences risk perception whereas SSSN, as a situational factor, is responsible 
for the observed difference in overall risk preference in previous studies.  If 
FNE influences perceived risk, it would then indirectly affect WTP and choice 
(see Equation 1).  
The task used in the pilot studies cannot assess the potential mediating 
effect of risk perception, because it measured only risk preference without 
assessment of risk perception or attitudes towards perceived-risk.  To address 
this question, in the Experiment, I decompose risk preference into component 
parts so that I measure quantitative indexes of the processes and assess 
individual influences of the two variables on them.  To be clear, I am not 
proposing a general model of risk preference.  There are a variety of factors 
that affect risk preference, including outcome feedback from previous risky 
decisions, aspiration levels, trust, expectations, and loss functions for outcomes 
that deviate from expectations (Slovic, 1977).  Rather I suggest a specific 
causal mechanism for better understanding the observed differences in financial 
risk preference between East Asian and Western cultures and for providing a 
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model in which one of the fundamentally causal variables (e.g., FNE) operates 
with a contextual variable (e.g., SSSN) in risk preference.   
In my study, I manipulate FNE and SSSN (including important sub-
components), and measure individual processes in risk taking (i.e., perceived 
risk, attitude, WTP, and choice).  There are two main predictions in this study. 
First, FNE influences risk perception and then indirectly affect risk preference. 
Second, SSSN directly influences risk preference but not risk perception.   
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3 Chapter 3 
 Experiment 
Figure 2.2 summarizes the proposed relationships among FNE, SSSN, 
and risk preference.  To test this idea, I explored the influences of FNE and 
SSSN on individual processes in risk preference.  I manipulated both the 
levels of FNE and SSSN as independent variables.  Then I created a more 
detailed set of stimuli varying outcome size (small vs. large), expected value, 
domain (gain/loss, gain, and loss), and probability of each option.  As seen in 
Table 3.1, each option has two potential outcomes.  For example, in the 
combined version of gain and loss (the top group of rows in Table 3.1), each 
option has one possible gain and one possible loss of money.  And options 
vary on their outcome size.  For example, the options A in the Small and Big 
outcome sizes in the Gain/Loss domain in Table 3.1 have the same probabilities 
of outcomes (0.65 for outcome 1 and 0.35 for outcome 2) differing in outcome 
size (e.g., $36 and $360 for outcome 1 in the Small and Big outcome sizes 
respectively) and, consequently, expected value ($11.5 vs. $115).  The 
probabilities of obtaining each outcome are shown both graphically and 
numerically.  The expected values and probabilities of individual options are 
shown in Table 3.1.   
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I asked participants to answer questions about their perceptions and 
reactions to the risky financial gamble options.  From each participant’s 
responses, five different indexes of risk preference were obtained, each of 
which reflects individual processes in risk preference: perceived risk, attitude 
towards perceived-risk, and WTP in Phase 1, and frequencies of choices of 
riskier option and choice reversals in Phase 2.  Specifically, in Phase 1, 
participants were asked to rate perceived risk on a scale and to write their WTP 
on an open questionnaire.  In addition to these two indexes, the index of 
Table 3.1: Samples of risky game options in Experiment in terms of their outcomes (O1 
and O2), probabilities (P1 and P2), expected values (EV).  
Domain Outcome Size Type O1 P1 O2 P2 EV 
A $36 0.65 -$34 0.35 11.5
B $43 0.65 -$47 0.35 11.5
A $45 0.6 -$35 0.4 13Small 
B $53 0.6 -$47 0.4 13
A $360 0.65 -$340 0.35 115
B $430 0.65 -$470 0.35 115




B $530 0.6 -$470 0.4 130
A $36 0.65 $34 0.35 35.3
B $43 0.65 $21 0.35 35.3
A $45 0.6 $38 0.4 42.2Small 
B $53 0.6 $26 0.4 42.2
A $360 0.65 $340 0.35 353
B $430 0.65 $210 0.35 353
A $450 0.6 $380 0.4 422
Gain 
Big 
B $530 0.6 $260 0.4 422
 
Note 1. Option type A is less risky but smaller in outcome than Option B.  
Note 2. Each domain has 16 options (i.e., 8 option pairs) in Experiment  
Note 3. There are another 16 options for Loss version which are transformations into 
minuses of the 16 options of the Gain version (so the option types are reversed in each 
pair). 
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attitude towards perceived risk was calculated (bR, see Equation 2).  For this, I 
followed the suggestion of the EV-subjective-risk model regressing WTP on 
the expected value of the option and on the perceived riskiness judgment 
provided by each respondent for each option:   
WTP(X) = a + bEVEV(X) + bRR(X)  (2)   
This model is used to account for individual and cultural differences in 
the perception of the riskiness of the options (Bontempo, Bottom, & Weber, 
1997; Weber & Hsee, 1998).  I used the results of the regression analysis of 
each participant’s WTP judgment on EV and perceived risk from the Equation 
2 and calculated value of the regression coefficient for perceived risk (i.g., bR).   
In phase 2, I calculated the proportion of choices of the riskier option 
and the number of choice reversals.  The same options used in the first phase 
were presented but I grouped the options into pairs as shown in Table 3.1.  
Each option in a pair had the same EV but the options differed in their rated 
riskiness and maximum values (i.e., variation).  Within a pair, one option is 
treated as riskier than the other when it was given a higher rated riskiness in 
phase 1.  In general, the option that had greater maximum gain and/or loss 
(e.g., probability of 0.65 for gaining $43 and 0.35 for losing $47) was judged as 
riskier than was the other option (e.g. probability of 0.65 for gaining $36 and 
0.35 for loosing $34).  There were few exceptions in participant’s judgments.  
For each pair, if a participant chose the option that was given a lower 
WTP in phase 1, it was counted as a choice reversal in phase 2.  However, I 
don’t expect WTP and choice responses be processed in entirely different ways 
in this study.  Instead, I measured choice responses because analyses only with 
ratings of WTP are not sufficient to understand whether a factor influences 
attitude towards perceived risk or risk preference directly.  The attitude index 
is calculated from the results of the regression analysis of each participant’s 
WTP judgment on EV and perceived risk (Bontempo et al., 1997; Weber & 
Hsee, 1998).  In this way, the two are interdependent.  Some previous 
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research demonstrated that people are sensitive to direct comparison of options 
in choice tasks whereas rating or pricing is based on sequential judgment of 
each outcome within an option (e.g., Schkade & Johnson, 1989).  Therefore, 
binary selection tasks such as choice among multiple alternative options 
provide an independent measurement of WTP when given multiple options, 
and, for that reason, have used in many aspiration level studies (Lopes & Oden, 
1999; Sokolowska & Pohorille, 2000).  Nonetheless, any discrepancy between 
WTP and choice judgments in this study can provide more insight into how 
FNE or SSSN influences risk preference in different ways.  Both WTP and 
choice are parallel in that they are sensitive to contextual variables but they 
differ in the degree to which they are sensitive to perceived risk.  For example, 
some contextual variables, e.g., aspiration level, make decision makers more 
insensitive to the perceived risk than do other contextual variables.  
In sum, if either FNE or SSSN reflects individual differences in risk 
preference, then it would be reflected on the index of perceived risk.  In 
contrast, if either of them is related to other processes rather than to risk 
perception itself, differences in the index either of attitude towards perceived-
risk or WTP would be observed.  Any difference in the number of choices of 
the riskier option and choice reversals would provide more insight into how 
variations of a candidate independent variable later influence decisions made by 
perceived risk.  Further, independent measurements of individual processes in 
risk preference provide insight into how (and which) aspects of SSSN influence 
risk preference.   
Of course, it is possible that the influences of FNE and SSSN are 
parallel.  In particular, the more concerned a person is with evaluation, the 
more risk seeking he or she should be for losses, because accepting a sure loss 
is more likely to lead to social disapproval than is risking a possibility of no 
loss.  For gains, people may want to look positive to their social network.  
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The larger their social network, the more pressure there will be to seek a 
potentially large gain.   
To test this possibility of social conformity as a mediator, I assessed the 
degree to which people were concerned with accepting a loss and the degree to 
which they felt that risky gambles for gains were perceived as socially 
positive.  To this end, a social conformity scale (SCS) was added (14 items) 
between the manipulations and the main task (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & 
Birum, 2002).  Although SSSN (or FNE) and social conformity can overlap 
with each other to some extent, the two differ in that social conformity 
represents low deviance or antisocial attitudes and behaviors, which has been 
shown to be positively related to positive evaluation from society (e.g., 
Newcomb, 1997).  If it turns out that people's risk preference in the gain and 
loss domains is mediated by values on SCS, then there would be a symmetry in 
the explanation of between FNE-risk preference (loss) and SSSN- risk 
preference (gain).  
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3.1 Manipulations and measurements of FNE and 
SSSN 
3.1.1 FNE manipulation in clinical research  
In my study, both FNE and SSSN were manipulated as independent 
variables.  In clinical research, fear/anxiety of evaluation is manipulated by 
giving people a strong cue that they will be evaluated the near future.  For 
example, Mansell and Clark (1999) induced participants’ social anxiety by 
telling them they would be giving a speech about a controversial topic and that 
the speech would be evaluated.  The technique of cue suggestion of speech 
technique has often been used as a way of inducing social anxiety (for further 
discussion, see Bandura, 1986).      
There are other ways to induce social anxiety as well.  For example, 
Bond and Omar (1990) induced participants’ social anxiety by asking them to 
read given words loudly.  Also, asking people to make a public speech was 
observed to have a similar effect to the cue suggestion technique (Behnke, 
Sawyer, & King, 1994). 
These methods usually produce a significant amount of state anxiety or 
negative mood (Mansell & Clark, 1999).  In general, people who are given a 
strong cue of evaluation in the near future have higher state anxiety than do 
those who were not given the cue. 
In sum, traditional manipulations of social anxiety such as FNE in 
clinical research share some common procedures.  First, as a prescreening 
participants’ trait anxiety is measured (e.g., Winton, Clark, & Edelmann, 1995).  
For this reason, the FNE scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), which is assumed to 
measure individuals chronic FNE, has been often used for this purpose (e.g., 
Winton et al., 1995).  Then, as discussed, social anxiety or evaluation fear is 
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induced by suggesting a cue that participants performances would be evaluated 
(Mansell & Clark, 1999) or by asking them to exhibit a public behavior 
(Behnke et al., 1994).  Obviously these techniques focus on manipulating 
people’s sensitivity to the current situation/task, thereby increasing state 
anxiety.  For this reason, state anxiety measurements are used as a 
manipulation check and, then, the amount of increase/decrease is compared 
between the prescreened (e.g., high vs. low trait anxiety or experimental vs. 
control) groups.   
3.1.2 FNE manipulation in Experiment 
In my study, I did not use a manipulation like the techniques just 
described.  The FNE scale was used for manipulation check rather than being 
used as a prescreening.  The main purpose of the FNE manipulation in this 
study is to increase/decrease each individual’s accessibility to their chronic 
FNE without creating differences in the levels of state anxiety or mood between 
them.  Further, as discussed, the ultimate goal of this dissertation is to address 
the causal mechanism of the observed cross-cultural differences.  It is unlikely 
that these differences are explained in terms of the differences in state anxiety 
between cultures.  For this reason, I gave participants a self-description task, 
which is assumed to be related more to one’s personal history than to current 
state.  This method should activate the concept of FNE but should not produce 
significant differences in participants’ levels of current anxiety or mood like the 
cue suggestion technique does.  To insure these points, I measured both 
participants’ FNE and state anxiety.   
The High FNE group was asked to describe their own experiences of 
being embarrassed because they were negatively evaluated by others whereas 
those in the Low FNE group were asked to write their own experience of 
embarrassing someone by negatively evaluating them.  
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This study does not have a “no-manipulation” condition.  Instead, the 
data are analyzed both for group differences between the levels of the 
independent variable as well as by examining relationships between the 
dependent variables and scores on the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale.  The 
two exposure tasks are designed to make the experimental treatments as 
homogeneous as possible except for the target variable of manipulation.  It is 
inappropriate to directly compare the performance of the High and Low FNE 
groups to that of neutral (i.e., no manipulation) group, because the no-
manipulation group has not thought at all about the concept of negative 
evaluation.   
3.1.3 Manipulation of SSSN 
For the manipulation of SSSN, it was assumed that the difficulty in 
listing network member influences the perception of the size of social network 
(i.e., subjective size of social network).  Participants in the Large SSSN 
condition were given background information that most of people, in average, 
can quickly list “three” closest friends when asked whereas those in the Small 
SSSN condition were told that “most of people, in average, can quickly list 
“twenty” closest friends when asked”.  The pilot studies revealed that it is 
difficult to list twenty friends in a minute (on average, participants listed about 
11).  As discussed, it was assumed that the relatively greater difficulty in 
listing friends in the Small SSSN condition produces a smaller subjective size 
of social network.  Both groups were asked to list as many friends possible in 
a minute, so the effect of the manipulation is on people’s perception of the size 
of their social network, not on the actual number of friends listed.  It is 
obviously, if any, an opposite direction of effect to our purpose of the 
manipulation.  In this manipulation, for example, the number of people listed 
in the Large SSSN condition could have an about the same deviation from the 
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given reference point (i.e., 3) with the number in the Small SSSN condition 
from the given reference point (i.e., 20).   
In sum, in the Experiment, a 2 × 2 design that FNE (High vs. Low) and 
SSSN (Large vs. Small) were manipulated between subjects.  I used the Fear 
of Negative Evaluation scale as a measure of FNE, (Watson & Friend, 1969) 
(for details, see Appendix 1).  To measure SSSN, each participant was given a 
set of nine questions; the size of the network, i.e., the number of network 
members, (Network Size), its density, i.e., the extent to which members are 
connected to each other (Density), its boundedness (Boundedness: the degree to 
which networks are defined on the basis of traditional group structures), its 
homogeneity (Homogeneity: extent to which individuals are similar to each 
other), the expectation of financial support from the network (Financial 
Support), and the expectation of the emotional support from the network 
(Emotional Support) on a scale from 1 to 10 (see Appendix 2).  These items 
are a collection of the main dimensions in previous research measuring size of 
social network (e.g., Biegel, Magaziner, & Baum, 1991; Chou, 1999; Moorer & 
Suurmeijer, 2001).   
3.2 Method 
Design 
The experiment used a 2 (FNE: High vs. Low) × 2 (SSSN: Large vs. 
Small) × 3 (domain: Gain/Loss, Pure Gain, and Pure Loss) × 2 (outcome size: 
Large and Small) design.  FNE and SSSN were manipulated between subjects.  
Domain and outcome size were within subjects.  The main dependent 
variables were perceived risk, risk attitude, WTP and choice.  
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Participants 
170 American undergraduate students at the University of Texas at 
Austin were given course credit for their participations in the study.  2 
participants whose native language was not English were excluded from the 
analyses in Experiment.  To ensure the validity of the FNE manipulation, a 
coding scheme was created for analyzing participants’ self-descriptions in the 
High and Low FNE conditions.  Participants’ responses were coded on 
whether they 1) described their being embarrassed because themselves were 
negatively evaluated by others; or 2) described their experience of embarrassing 
others by negatively evaluating them.  Obviously, participants in the High and 
Low conditions should respond in terms of the former and the latter coding 
schemes respectively.  Two coders examined participants’ self-descriptions 
(intercoder reliability = .91) and 9 participants who did not follow this scheme 
or did not give any relevant description were not included in the analyses.  As 
a result, 159 participants were included in the analyses.    
As described above, the High FNE group was asked to describe there 
own experiences of being embarrassed because they were negatively evaluated 
by others whereas those in the Low FNE group were asked to write their own 
experience of embarrassing someone by negatively evaluating them.  
Participants in the two SSSN conditions were asked to list as many friends 
possible but the two groups were given different background information (i.e., 
3 vs. 20).    
After the manipulations, all participants responded to the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation scale and the question set for SSSN as manipulation 
checks.  Participants were then given the social conformity scale (SCS) and 
PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule) for the measurement of 
positive/negative mood.  20 items of the PANAS were used to test whether 
observed differences in risk preference between FNE and/or SSSN conditions 
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are mediated by a difference in the level of positive/negative mood.  This scale 
measures participants’ positive affect and negative affect (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988).  Positive Affect reflects the extent to which a person feels 
enthusiastic, active, and alert.  In contrast, Negative Affect is a general 
dimension of subjective distress and unpleasurable engagement that subsumes a 
variety of aversive mood states, including anger, contempt, disgust, fear, and 
nervousness.  The two mood factors have emerged as highly distinctive 
orthogonal dimensions in factor analytic studies of affect (Watson et al., 1988). 
Questionnaires and procedure  
After the manipulations of FNE and SSSN, the manipulation checks, 
and the measurements of social conformity and mood, participants answered 
questions about their perceptions and reactions to financially risky gambles.  
As described, each gamble had two potential outcomes.  For example, in the 
combined version of gain and loss (Gain/Loss), each option had one possible 
gain and one possible loss of money.  The probabilities of obtaining each 
outcome were shown both graphically and numerically.  The expected values 
and probabilities of individual options are shown in Table 3.1.   
In the phase 1, participants saw each of the 48 options.  They were told 
to assume that they were gambling.  They were instructed to examine each 
gamble separately, to consider the possible losses and gains, and to answer the 
following questions: “How risky do you think this investment option is?” and 
“what is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to get a chance at 
this gamble (if you would not buy it at any price, say $0.)”  Perceived 
riskiness of the option is expressed on a numerical rating scale that ranged from 
0 (not at all risky) to 10 (extremely risky). From the two indexes, the index of 
the attitude towards perceived risk for each option was calculated.   
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In phase 2, participants were asked to choose one from a pair of options.  
The same gambles used in the first phase were presented.  Each gamble pair 
has the same EV but vary in their rated riskiness and maximum values.   
3.3 Results  
3.3.1 Manipulation checks and the analyses of SC and PANAS 
First, I checked the effectiveness of the FNE manipulation and the 
SSSN induction with participants’ scores on the FNE scale and the SSSN 
question set.  Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the average scores on the FNE scale 
and the SSSN question set, and planned t-tests for them between conditions 
respectively.  As shown in the Tables, average values on the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation scale were significantly higher in the High FNE conditions than in 
the Low FNE conditions. Average values on the Fear of Negative Evaluation 
scale were significantly higher in the High FNE condition (M = 17.20) than in 
the Low FNE condition (M = 13.43), t (157) = 3.56, p < .01. There was no 
significant difference in FNE between the Large SSSN condition (M = 15.02) 
and the Small SSSN condition (M = 15.58), t (157) = .50, p =.613.  Further 
analyses indicated that the two FNE groups significantly differed in eight items 
of the FNE scale (in call cases, p < .01).  There were also three items that 




To explore each participant’s SSSN, I took the sum of the nine 
judgments participants made.  A reliability analysis indicated that the nine 
judgments were consistent enough to be summed into one index (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .66). There was no significant correlation between the FOI 
manipulation and SSSN induction indicating that the two did not have 
systematic influence on each other.  FNE had a significant correlation neither 
with any sub-component in SSSN or the single index.  Further, because there 
was no significant interaction of any measured variables between the two 
manipulations (in all cases, p > .3), I compared responses in terms either of the 
two FNE groups or two SSSN groups in subsequent analyses. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Illustrations of manipulation checks of FNE and SSSN, and descriptions of 
participants’ responses on SCS and PANAS. 
Conditions 
Measurement 
High FNE – 
Large SSSN
High FNE – 
Small SSSN
Low FNE – 
Large SSSN 
Low FNE – 
Small SSSN
FNE Scale  16.93 17.49 13.13 13.73 
SSSN  47.05 40.44 44.73 40.20 
Network Size 4.51 3.74 4.23 3.54 
Density 5.80 5.67 5.40 4.75 
Homogeneity 6.58 5.13 5.50 5.63 
Boundedness 6.90 5.54 6.53 6.08 
Financial 
Support 4.01 4.31 4.95 4.08 
SSSN 
Emotional 
Support 5.70 4.85 5.43 5.38 
Positive affect 26.90 28.77 26.73 27.33 PANAS 
Negative affect 15.08 15.15 16.10 15.03 
SCS 33.45 33.77 32.38 33.85 
Note 1: All values are average scores for each condition.  
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Participants in the Large SSSN group (45.89) gave higher judgments to  
the SSSN question set than did those in the Small SSSN group (40.31), t (157) 
= 2.84, p < .01.  There was no significant difference in SSSN between the 
High FNE (M = 43.78) and the Low FNE conditions (M = 42.46), t (157) = .66, 
p =.512.  Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show average scores of the individual components 
in the SSSN question set and planned t-tests for them between the two SSSN 
conditions respectively.  It indicated that the SSSN manipulation influenced 
mainly Network Size and Boundedness though the Large SSSN group showed 
higher average scores in all components than did the Small SSSN group.   
Further analyses indicated that Financial Support acts differently than 
do the other factors of SSSN.  The other five components were significantly 
(and positively) correlated with each other (in all cases, r > .2, p < .01).  
Table 3.3: Planned t-tests for FNE, components in SSSN, PANAS, and SCS between 
FNE conditions and between SSSN conditions.  
 High vs. Low FNE groups 
Large vs. Small 
SSSN groups 
FNE 17.20 vs. 13.25 ** 15.02 vs. 15.58 
Network Size 4.13 vs. 3.88 4.37 vs. 3.63 ** 
Density 5.73 vs. 5.08 5.60 vs. 5.20 
Homogeneity 5.86 vs. 5. 56 6.04 vs. 5.38 
Boundedness 6.22 vs. 6.30 6.71 vs. 5.81 * 
Financial Support 4.15 vs. 4.57 4.47 vs. 4.19 
SSSN 
Emotional 
Support 5.28 vs. 5.40 5.56 vs. 5.11 
Positive affect  27.82 vs. 27.03 26.81 vs. 28.03 
PANAS 
Negative affect 15.11 vs. 15.56 15.58 vs. 15.09 
SCS 34. 11 vs. 33. 12 33. 41 vs. 33.81 
Note 1: All values are average scores for each condition.  
Note 2: * and ** indicate a significance at 0.05 level and 0.01 level respectively.  
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However, Financial Support was correlated only with Network Size (r = .24, p 
< .01) and Emotional support (r = .36, p < .01).  Although a factor analysis did 
not provided a clear dimensional distinction between the six factors of SSSN, 
these results may be consistent with previous studies suggesting that SSSN 
consists mainly of the number of members of the network (i.e., size itself) and 
expectation of social/material/emotional supports from the network but the two 
are weakly correlated with each other (Barrera, 1986; Furukawa et al., 1999).  
The groups did not differ in the overall levels of positive and negative 
mood.  Planned t-tests indicated that there were no significant differences in 
the scores on the two affect scales among the SSSN and FNE conditions nor 
was there interaction (in all cases, p >.25).  These findings rule out the 
possibility that mood was systematically confounded with FNE or SSSN.  And 
there was no difference in social conformity between FNE or SSSN conditions.  
A two-way ANOVA of FNE and SSSN did not produce any significant 
difference in social conformity or interaction between the conditions (in all 
cases, P >.3).1 
Most importantly, for eleven questions on the FNE scale, including the 
collapsed scale score, there were significant differences between the two FNE 
groups.  However, the two groups did not differ in their state anxiety or mood.  
Taken together, these results indicated that the FNE manipulation affected 
participants’ accessibility to their chronic FNE without creating differences in 
the levels of state anxiety or mood between them. 
                                                 
1 Social conformity had significant relationships with a few sub-components in SSSN.  
The correlations of conformity with Boundedness (r = .23, p < .01) and Network Size 
(r = .18, p <.05) were significant.  However there was no significant relationship 
between social conformity and any of the individual processes in risk preference.  
Further analyses indicated that social conformity did not have any indirect influence on 
the individual processes in risk preference (in all cases, p >.3).  Therefore, I did not 
take social conformity into further analyses. 
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3.3.2 Influences of FNE and SSSN on risk preference  
Next, I analyzed risk preference judgment.  The data are shown in 
Table 3.4.  A four-way ANOVA of FNE × SSSN × domain × outcome size 
revealed a significant main effects of domain and outcome size in perceived 
risk, WTP and the two indexes of choice responses (in all cases, p < .05) 
reflecting, for example, relatively higher perceived risk for options of the larger 
outcome size in loss domain for those of the lower outcome size in other 
domains.  These effects are not germane to the aim of this study and, further, 
there was no significant interaction of these variables with the two 
manipulations (in all cases, p > .3).  Therefore, I will not discuss them further 
in following analyses.  
Perceived risk 
I analyzed each participant’s mean judgment of perceived risk.  There 
was no significant three-way interaction of FNE, SSSN, and domain, F (1, 155) 
= .04, p = .843.  A reliability analysis indicated that the three judgments were 
consistent enough to be summed into one index (Cronbach’s alpha = .64). 
Table 3.4: Illustrations of risk preference in the FNE and SSSN conditions. 
Risk preference High FNE – Large SSSN
High FNE – 
Small SSSN
Low FNE – 
Large SSSN 
Low FNE – 
Small SSSN
Perceived risk (M) 5.22 5.15 5.69 5.70 
Risk attitude (M) -1.41 -1.42 -1.38 -1.40 







Choices of the riskier 
options 9.95 8.00 8.25 6.73 
Choice reversals 4.48 4.28 4.5 3.61 
Note 1. The numbers in parentheses in WTP are indexes transformed to a logarithmic 
scale. 
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Average perceived risk was significantly lower in the High FNE condition (M = 
5.18) than in the Low FNE condition (M = 5.69), t (157) = 2.70, p < .01. To 
further examine the effect of FNE, an ANCOVA that included the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation scale score as a covariate was performed.  If level of FNE 
influenced participants’ risk perception, then the difference between FNE 
groups should decrease when the scale values are added as a covariate.  
Consistent with this logic, the effect of the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale 
score was significant, F (1, 156) = 17.08, p < .01, and the condition effect was 
reduced to non-significance, F (1, 156) = 2.55, p = .119.  As expected, the 
relationship between FNE and risk perception was significantly negative (r = -
.35, p < .05).  These results indicate that levels of FOI decrease the degree of 
perceived risk. A Sobel (1982) test indicated that FNE, as a mediator, was 
indeed responsible for the difference in perceived risk between the two FNE 
conditions (Sobel Test = -2.66, p <.01).  In contrast, none of the sub-
components in SSSN including the collapsed single index had a significant 
correlation with participants’ perceived risk. 
WTP 
Table 3.4 shows the overall WTP in the FEN and SSSN conditions. 
There was no interaction in overall WTP between FNE and SSSN 
manipulations, F (1, 155) = .37, p = .545, nor was there a significant three-way 
interaction of the two manipulations and domain, F (1, 155) = .38, p = .536.  
A reliability analysis indicated that the three judgments were consistent 
enough to be summed into one index (Cronbach’s alpha = .65).     
Then we compared the average of the WTP for each participant in the 
Large SSSN (or High FNE) condition to that in the Small SSSN (or Low FNE) 
group.  There were no significant differences in WTP between the Large 
SSSN condition (M = 66.4) and the Small SSSN condition (M = 64.3), t (157) 
= .47, p =.642, nor between the High FNE group (M = 65.8) and the Low FNE 
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group (M = 65.4), t (1, 157) = .84, p = .405.  However, a correlation analysis 
indicated that WTP had a significantly positive correlation with one’s 
expectation of financial support (Financial Support), which was one of the 
measured components in SSSN (r = .29, p< .05).  Neither FNE nor any other 
aspect of SSSN showed a significantly positive relationship with WTP.  Note 
that the SSSN manipulation in this dissertation influenced mainly one’s 
perceived number of network member (Network Size) rather than Financial 
Support.  These together, the current results indicate that a person’s WTP for 
risky options is systematically influenced by one’s expectation of financial 
support from network members. Further, as discussed, FNE may have an 
indirect influence on WTP despite its lack of a direct influence.  I will address 
these points later using structure equation modeling.   
Risk attitude 
For the index of attitude towards perceived risk (bR, see Equation 2), I 
followed the suggestion of the EV-subjective-risk model, and regressed WTP 
on the expected value of the option and on the perceived riskiness judgment 
provided by each respondent for each option (Weber & Hsee, 1998):   
WTP(X) = a + bEVEV(X) + bRR(X)  (2) 
This model allows for individual differences in the perception of the 
riskiness of the options (Bontempo et al., 1997; Weber & Hsee, 1998).  This 
model was fit to each participant’s 48 WTP judgments.  The model accounted 
for an average of 41% of the variance in WTP across participants, with a range 
from 13% to 99%.  None of the regression coefficients of the model were 
significantly different as a function of FNE or SSSN group.2  Further, analyses 
of scatter plots indicated that the coefficient b was linear in range tested.   
                                                 
2 As Hsee and Weber (1998) addressed, multicollinearity should not be a concern for 
the model (Equation 2).  Another model considered in their study was, P(X) = a + 
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I used the results of the regression analysis of each participant’s WTP 
judgment on EV and perceived risk from the Equation 2 and calculated the 
value of the regression coefficient for perceived risk (i.g., bR).  The analyses 
indicated that no factors included in this study had a reliable influence on 
attitude towards perceived risk.  
There were no significant differences in the index of risk attitude 
between the Large SSSN condition (M = -1.40) and the Small SSSN condition 
(M = -1.41), t (157) = .08, p =.937, nor between the High FNE group (M = -
1.42) and the Low FNE group (M = -1.40), t (1, 157) = .82, p = .411.  Neither 
FNE nor any individual sub-components in SSSN showed a significant 
relationship with risk attitude index.  These results are consistent with Weber 
and Hsee’s study (1999), in which they did not observe cross-cultural 
difference in risk attitude.  In sum, the results indicated that FNE and SSSN 
were not related to risk attitude.   
Choice of riskier options 
As described, I calculated two indexes from each participant’s choice 
responses in phase 2: (a) choices of the riskier option and (b) choice reversals.  
To measure each participant’s choices of the riskier option, I counted the 
number of times each participant selected the riskier option for each option pair.  
Then I calculated a single index of choices of the riskier option based on the 
percentage score of the counted number for the total choices (i.e., 24 choices) 
for each participant such that, for example, a participant’s score of 33 indicates 
33% of his/her choices was of the riskier options.   
                                                                                                                                  
bEVEV(X) + bRVAR(X), which VAR represents the objective difference between two 
possible outcomes of an option.  The multicollinearity (between EV and VAR) was 
observed only when this model was considered both in their and my studies. 
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The Large SSSN group (M = 37.9) chose the riskier options 
significantly more often than did the Small SSSN group (M = 30.6), t (157) = 
2.80, p < .01.  There was a marginally significant difference in the index 
between the High FNE condition (M = 35.8) and the Low FNE condition (M = 
32.7), t (157) = 1.70, p =.091.  However, correlation analyses indicated that 
the choice of riskier option had a significant positive relationship with Network 
Size in SSSN (r = .41, p < .01) but not with FNE.  No other aspects of SSSN 
showed a significant relationship with the index.   
To further explore the relationship between the Network Size and the 
choice of riskier option, an ANCOVA was performed, which included Network 
Size as a covariate.  If the size of network influenced participants’ risk 
perception, then the difference between the two SSSN groups should decrease 
when participants’ ratings for their Network Size are added as a covariate.  
Consistent with the logic, the effect of the Network Size was significant, F (1, 
156) = 25.89, p < .01, and the condition effect was reduced to marginal 
significance, F (1, 156) = 3.46, p = .07.  A Sobel (1982) test indicated that 
Network Size, as a mediator, was indeed responsible for the difference in 
choice of riskier option between the two SSSN conditions (Sobel Test = 3.43, p 
<.01).  In sum, the results indicated that one’s choice of riskier option was 
systematically influenced by his/her Network Size.  
Choice reversal 
I was also interested in factor that would lead to preference reversals.  
Choice reversals were defined as the choice of the riskier option in phase 2 
even when the riskier option was given less WTP in Phase 1.  To measure 
each participant’s choice reversals, I counted the number of times each 
participant selected the option that was given a lower WTP in the first phase.  
As I did for the riskier option, I calculated an index of choice reversals based on 
the percentage of the 24 option pairs that led to choice reversals.    
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Participants in the Large SSSN group (M = 18.7) made more choice 
reversals than did those in the Small SSSN (M = 16.5) group but the difference 
was not significant, t (157) = 1.29, p =.198.  This difference may reflect the 
significant but weak correlation between Network Size and the index of choice 
reversals (r = .17, p < .05).  No other factors showed significant correlation 
with the choice reversal index.  Although there was no effect of outcome size, 
when the outcomes were larger the effect of Network Size was observed to be 
stronger than when they were small.  This finding suggests that participants in 
the Large SSSN group (M = 19.6) showed marginally more choice reversals 
than did those in the Small SSSN (M = 16.0) group, t (157) = 1.86, p =.064.  
The correlation between the Network Size and choice reversal in the Big 
outcome size was positively significant (r = .27 p < .05).   
The results in this section indicate that people who had a larger SSSN 
were more risk taking when choosing one between two alternative options with 
the same expected value, and that Network Size is the factor most responsible 
for these observations.  
Risk perception, WTP, and choice 
I also analyzed the relationships among perceived risk, WTP, and 
choices of riskier option in each domain.  Table 3.5 illustrates the individual 
correlations between perceived risk, WTP and choice of riskier option in the 
Gain/Loss, Gain, and Loss domains.  As shown in Table 3.5, perceived risk 
has a significant negative relationship with WTP in all domains.  Perceived 
risk had significantly negative (but overall lower than its relationship with 
WTP) relationships only with risky choices in Gain/Loss, and Gain domains.  
The correlation between perceived risk and choice in the Gain domain was not 
significant indicating that only Network Size was responsible for the observed 
differences between the groups in that domain.  As discussed in introduction, 
aspiration level or expectation of expenditure, which is probably related to the 
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Network Size, might strongly constrain participant’s choice judgments in this 
domain.  In sum, WTP is influenced mainly by perceived risk whereas choice 
may be affected by other variables beyond perceived risk. 
Those relationships are important because, first, the analyses of the 
relationships between WTP and choice provide insight into how/why these two 
measures often differ (e.g., Schkade & Johnson, 1989), and second, the positive 
relationships between perceived risk and WTP/Choice are the routes through 
which FNE indirectly influences risk preference in general as well as its direct 
influence on risk perception.   
Of particular interest, these results explain why inducing a higher level 
of FNE made participants more risk-seeking in the Loss domain whereas 
manipulating SSSN showed a consistent effect in the Gain domain across 
cultures in the pilot studies.  In pilot studies, experimentally increased FNE 
probably decreased perceived risk both in the Gain and Loss domains but the 
decreased perceived risk might not influence risk-taking in the Gain domain.  
In sum, the results indicate that the participants followed the risk-value 
(R-V) model, which leads to the negative relationship between perceived risk 
and risk preference.  Specifically, there were negative relationships of 
Table 3.5: Individual correlations between perceived risk, WTP and choices of riskier 
option in Gain/Loss, Gain, and Loss domains.  
 Domain 
 Overall Gain/Loss Gain Loss 
PR- WTP -.31** -.20* -.28** -.28** 
PR – Choice -.17 -.20** .08 -.19* 
WTP - Choice .07 .13 -.07 .02 
Note 1: PR, WTP, and Choice represent perceived risk, willingness to pay, and choice 
of riskier option respectively.  
Note 2: * and ** indicate a significance at 0.05 level and 0.01 level respectively.  
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perceived risk to choice in the Gain/Loss and Loss domains, and to WTP in all 
domains.   
Nonetheless, as shown in Table 3.5, there were discrepancies between 
WTP and choice within each participant in this study.  The correlations 
between the two types of risk-taking in the three domains were not neither 
significant nor strong.  As discussed, WTP was influenced by Financial 
Support whereas Network Size was responsible for the explanations of 
differences in choice.  Taken together, the current results suggest that any 
exclusive increase in either of the two factors in SSSN could produce an 
inconsistency between WTP and choice.  But WTP and choice were assumed 
to reflect the same influence of a culture on risk-taking in the studies of the 
cushion hypothesis (Hsee & Weber, 1999; Weber & Hsee, 1998).   
In sum, analyses of individual correlations between perceived risk, 
WTP, and choice indicated that both WTP and choice were mediated by 
perceived risk (except in the Gain domain for choices).  These results raise the 
question of whether FNE, which was observed to systematically decrease 
perceived risk, could have indirect influences on WTP and choice through the 
perceived risk, even though FNE does not have direct relationships to WTP and 
choice.  In my model, multiple factors influence risk taking in different ways.  
A good way to explain these findings may be to interpret the observations in 
terms of direct and indirect relationships between variables (Alwin & Hauser, 
1975; Bryman & Cramer, 1990).  Structural equation modeling provides a 
good test of indirect path when there is no direct relationship between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable.  I demonstrated this issue by 
examining indirect paths from FNE to WTP or choice through perceived risk as 
well as direct paths from Financial Support and Network Size to WTP and 
choice respectively.   
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Model evaluation: SEM tests  
To clarify, the purpose of the SEM tests in this dissertation is not to 
evaluate all individual relationships between the (many) factors but rather to 
confirm the indirect influences of FNE on WTP and choice.  For this reason, I 
adopted two simplified models (one for WTP and the other for choice) at the 
expense of specific illustrations of the relationships between FNE and SSSN 
and individual processes in risk preference.  The two structural equation 
models explain indirect and direct paths from FNE and SSSN to WTP and 
choice respectively.  Further, these two models illustrate the two different 
ways that these factors influence risk preference.   
To demonstrate the direct and indirect paths of factors to risk-taking, 
structural equation modeling techniques were conducted with SPSS AMOS 4.0.  
Initially, several alternative models were tested in addition to the hypothesized 
models but the each of the two hypothesized model below had the best fit.  
The two models were constructed with directional paths from a predictor (i.e., 
Financial Support or Network Size) in SSSN and indirect paths from FNE 
through perceived risk to WTP or choice of riskier option respectively.  
Following Jaccard and Wan’s guideline, (1996, p. 130), model fits were 
evaluated with four goodness-of-fit indices in addition to chi-square fit: the 
adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI, Bollen, 1989), the comparative fit index 
(CFI, Hu & Bentler, 1998), the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI, Tucker & Lewis, 
1973), and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA, Steiger, 
1990).  Figure 3.1 shows the relevant models with path coefficients, and Table 
3.6 presents the estimate, standard error, and test statistic t for each structural 
path in the models for WTP and choice respectively.   
The SEM model for WTP supported the idea that FNE indirectly 
influences WTP whereas Financial Support has a direct influence on WTP.  
The model demonstrated: (a) FNE is negatively linked to perceived risk; (b) 
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perceived risk is negatively linked to WTP; and (3) Financial Support is 
positively linked to WTP. Figure 3.1a displays the hypothesized relations 
among variables. (Residual variables are omitted for the sake of clarity)  All 
hypothesized pathways in the model were significant (see WTP in Table 3.6).  
Especially, the estimates for the relationships between FNE and WTP suggested 
that the higher one’s FNE the less his/her perceived risk.  That lower 
perceived risk leads to greater WTP.   
In addition to the chi-square fit, χ2(22, N = 159) = 33.24, p < .05, the 
four fit indices consistently indicate good model fits for this model (overall 
model: AGFI = .921, CFI = .936, TLI = .919, RMSEA = .057), indicating that 
the model is acceptable.  In sum, the model indicates that FNE has an indirect 
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Figure 3.1: Structural equation models for WTP (A) and choice of riskier option (B) with 
significant coefficients at 0.05 level. 
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In the model for choice of riskier options, the best model was created by 
separating the relationships between perceived risk and choice by domains.  In 
this model, FNE has an indirect influence on choice through its influence on 
perceived risk only in Gain/Loss and Loss domains, indicating that the indirect 
influence of FNE on choice depends on domain.  In the Gain domain, 
participants’ choice judgments were explained only by Network Size.  All 
hypothesized pathways in the overall model were significant (see Choice in 
Table 3.6).  But the four fit indices provide somewhat inconsistent model fits 
for this model (overall model: AGFI = .888, CFI = .795, TLI = .726, RMSEA 
= .085).  According to chi-square fit, χ2(20, N = 159) = 47.45, p < .01, and 
AGFI, this model is acceptable but, strictly on statistical grounds, the model 
should be rejected because the values of the other three indices are not 
acceptable enough.  However, the patterns of the significant coefficients 
indicate that FNE has an indirect positive relationship with choice while 
Network Size directly increases choice of riskier option. 
Table 3.6: Standard Estimates, Standard Errors, and Test Statistics (t) for pathways 
between measures in WTP and Choice.  
                               Willingness to Pay 
Outcome and pathways Estimate SE ta 
FNE → Perceived risk -.058 .013 -4.484 
Perceived risk → WTP -2.746 .589 -4.665 
Financial support → WTP .509 .154 3.309 
                                 Choice 
FNE → Perceived risk -.063 .013 -4.861 
Perceived risk → Choice 
 (Gain/Loss domain) -.192 .081 -2.355 
Perceived risk → Choice 
 (Gain domain) -.246 .116 -2.126 
Financial support → Choice .293 .056 5.186 
a t >.20 or t < .-2.0 indicates statistical significance ( p < .05). 
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4 Chapter 4  
Conclusions and discussion 
4.1 Summary of the results  
This study demonstrated that FNE and SSSN influence risk preference 
in different ways.  The observed patterns and analyses of the relationships 
between independent variables (FNE and SSSN) and processes (perceived risk, 
WTP and choice) in risk preference were consistent with the predictions of the 
model in this dissertation.  Participants in the High FNE group exhibited 
relatively lower perceived risk than did those in the Low FNE group whereas 
no factors of SSSN had a significant correlation with participants’ perceived 
risk.  When Fear of Negative Evaluation scale values were incorporated into 
the analyses as a covariate, they were significantly related to the degree of 
perceived risk, and the strength of the effect of FNE manipulation was 
decreased. 
In contrast, the results indicated that people who had a larger SSSN 
were more risk-seeking in WTP and choice but the two were observed to differ 
in their related factors.  Specifically, people’s WTP for risky options was 
systematically influenced by their expectation of financial support from 
network members whereas Network Size was observed to be responsible for the 
observed difference in choices of riskier option and choice reversals.   
Analyses of individual correlations between perceived risk, WTP and 
choice and structural equation modeling indicated that both WTP and choice 
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were mediated by perceived risk except in the Gain domain for choices.  
These results suggest that FNE, which was observed to systematically decrease 
perceived risk, has indirect influences on WTP and choice through perceived 
risk, even though FNE does not have a direct relationship to these outcome 
measures.   
In sum, the results of Experiment indicate that FNE influences 
perceived-risk, which in turn affects willingness to pay and choice whereas 
SSSN directly affects WTP and choice without being mediated by perceived 
risk.  These findings demonstrate that both SSSN and FNE influence risk 
preference but in different ways, clarifying the previous work done by Hsee and 
Weber and supporting the current model in this dissertation for the explanation 
of cross-cultural differences in risk preference in previous studies.     
4.2 Implications for the cushion hypothesis 
The current study replicated the cushion hypothesis by showing that the 
two factors of SSSN were observed to influence risk preference.  It suggests 
that, if there is a difference in either (or both) of these factors between cultures 
or groups, then we can predict some relevant difference in risk preference.  It 
is consistent with the prediction of cushion hypothesis.  Further, this study 
elaborates the cushion hypothesis by identifying multiple sub-components in 
SSSN, each of which explains a specific influence of SSSN to individual 
processes on risk preference, and by showing how SSSN influences them.  
Nonetheless, there are some important discrepancies between this model 
and Hsee and Weber’s cushion hypothesis.  First, as discussed, according to 
the cushion hypothesis (Hsee & Weber, 1999; Weber & Hsee, 1998), greater 
risk preferences in WTP and choice are rooted in a less perceived risk caused 
by a larger subjective size of social network, more specifically, one’s greater 
expectation of financial support from the network.  However, in the current 
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study, a greater risk preference was caused by an indirect influence of FNE 
through its direct effects of risk perception on WTP and choice as well as direct 
influences of sub-components in SSSN on WTP and choice.  This issue is 
particularly important because even the cushion hypothesis assumes that a 
factor influences risk perception should be treated as the main causal variable 
for the explanation of cross-cultural difference or group difference (Weber & 
Hsee, 1998).  Further, as discussed above, SSSN was observed to influence 
WTP and choice in different ways in this study.  Indeed, SSSN is a broad 
variable, which includes various sub-components.  This issue was not 
addressed in the studies of cushion hypothesis.   
To be clear, I am not proposing a general model of risk preference.  
There are a variety of general factors that affect risk preference, including 
outcome feedback from previous risky decisions, aspiration levels, trust, 
expectations, and loss functions for outcomes that deviate from expectations 
(Slovic, 1977).  Instead, I suggest a specific causal mechanism for better 
understanding the observed differences in financial risk preference between 
East Asian and Western cultures.  This dissertation focuses on the relationship 
between FNE, which has been demonstrated to be sensitive chronic aspects 
between cultures, and risk-taking and elaboration of SSSN in explaining cross-
cultural differences in risk preference.   
Nonetheless, there may be a difference in generalizability between the 
cushion hypothesis and my model.  The cushion hypothesis, which dealt with 
SSSN, predicts (and observes) cross-cultural difference only for the financial 
domain.  For example, Hsee and Weber (1999) found a cross-cultural 
difference in risk preference in the financial domain between Chinese and 
American participants but not in other domains such as medical and academic 
situations.  But research has shown opposite directions of cross-cultural 
differences in various domains between the two (i.e., East Asian and Western) 
cultures.  For example, East Asians have been observed to be more sensitive to 
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social risk than are members of Western cultures (Weber, Hsee, & Sokolowska, 
1998).  Indeed, it is unlikely that behaviors in domains other than financial 
risk are not related to risk perception.  Importantly, according to both the 
cushion hypothesis and my model, at least one candidate factor should explain 
the variation in risk perception between cultures or individuals for the 
explanation of cross-cultural/group differences in risk preference.  The results 
of the current study indicated that SSSN has a relationship only to (monetary) 
WTP and choice whereas FNE has a direct influence on risk perception.  Thus, 
my model has further potentiality as a general causal model of risk preference 
for the explanation of cross-cultural differences in risk perception in other 
domains.  If so, future research should address how the relationship between 
FNE and risk perception differ between domains.   
4.3 Implications for cross-cultural research 
I suggest that FNE influences risk preference as a factor, which reflects 
individual and cultural differences, whereas SSSN is sensitive to situations and 
contexts rather than reflecting chronic aspects of individuals or cultures.  On 
this view, cross-cultural differences should be understood in terms of the 
considerations of both chronic and situational aspects of a culture (Oyserman, 
Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002).  Studies examining SSSN have demonstrated 
that SSSN is highly sensitive to current situations and contexts (e.g., current 
income and grade in school) rather than to variables that reflect chronic aspects 
of groups (e.g., gender) or cultures (Tanaka et al., 1997).  However, members 
in East Asian and Western cultures have been consistently observed to differ in 
their chronic levels of social anxiety e.g., interdependent self-construal and 
FNE, (Kim & Markman, in preparation; Okazaki, 1997; Okazaki, Liu, 
Longworth, & Minn, 2002).   
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Taken together, these observations help resolve the inconsistency 
between the results of my pilot studies and those of studies in the cushion 
hypothesis.  In my pilot studies there was no significant difference in any 
factors of SSSN between Korean and American participants whereas FNE was 
higher in Korean participants in American participants.  But previous studies 
of the cushion hypothesis often found differences in SSSN only between 
Chinese and Americans (e.g., Hsee & Weber, 1999).  Few studies, however, 
observed a consistently larger SSSN across East Asian countries.  The 
inconsistency, therefore, indicates that SSSN is sensitive to the current 
situational/contextual aspects in societies rather than reflecting a common 
chronic aspect of a culture.  However, for example, FNE and interdependent 
self-construal have been observed to be consistently higher in the collectivist 
culture, which includes all East Asian countries, than in individualist culture.    
Further, previous studies in risk preference suggest that individual 
differences are directly related to risk perception whereas situational variables 
are mainly related to one’s interpretation of the target return from the given 
option or the tradeoff between risks and benefits (Sokolowska & Tyszka, 1995; 
Weber et al., 2002).  Likewise, in this study, FNE was observed to be related 
to risk perception whereas SSSN directly influenced WTP and choice.  
The current study has some implications for studies in cross-cultural 
difference in judgment and decision making in general.  Most behavioral 
research has focused on the individual relationship between a variable and a 
process of risk preference.  This approach itself is contributable to the 
descriptions of cross-cultural differences.  However, we should be careful in 
applying the individually observed patterns and relationships between variables 
to the explanation of causal mechanism of the observations.   Without this 
work, we often misleadingly locate a factor on the causal chain and interpret 
observations in terms of the causally irrelevant but eventually related factor.  
This study demonstrates that SSSN is the case in previous studies.  
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4.4 Limitations and future research  
The relationships between SSSN and both WTP and choice are harder to 
explain.  Two different relationships SSSN with WTP and choice were 
observed in this study but I do not have theoretically sufficient explanations for 
these observations.  Furthermore, to my knowledge, this dissertation is the 
first demonstration of the individual relationships that sub-factors of SSSN 
have on different processes in risk taking in cross-cultural research.  More 
theoretically/empirically comprehensive examinations of the relationships 
should follow this dissertation.   
Participants in the Large SSSN group made more choice reversals than 
did those in the Small SSSN group but the difference was not significant.  One 
reason for the small effect of Network Size in choice reversals may be the 
overall low frequency of choice reversals.  Looking at 3.1, it is possible that 
the option pairs in this study did not have enough difference in maximum 
values between options.  Another potential reason for the marginal 
significance may be that the manipulation of SSSN was not specific enough to 
create choice reversals.  For example, recent studies of aspiration level (e.g., 
Sokolowska, in preparation) specifically primed a target return by presenting a 
clear aspiration level but there was no explicit priming in this study.  This 
point should be addressed in future studies.   
An important issue should be addressed from the results of the pilot 
studies is the applicability of the translated scales and cognitive tasks used in 
this study, including those in the pilot studies, and Hsee and Weber’s (1999) 
studies.  As discussed, in pilot studies, levels of FNE and SSSN were 
positively correlated with the degree of risk preference in the Gain and Loss 
domains respectively within each culture.  However, Koreans did not show a 
significantly larger risk preference even though their scores on the FNE scale 
were much higher than were those of American participants.  There was no 
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systematic influences of translations or currency between US Dollar ($) and 
Korean Won (₩) in Korean data.  Otherwise there would be consistently 
higher or lower risk preferences across domains or outcome sizes in Korean 
than in American participants but they were not the cases in the pilot studies.  
This inconsistency suggests that the materials used in the current study (like 
many other cross-cultural studies in J/DM research) have some limitation in 
being directly applied to cross-cultural comparisons.  This issue is beyond the 
scope of the current dissertation research proposal.  My aim is to understand 
cross-cultural difference in risk preference not through a direct comparison of 
risk-taking between cultures but through different patterns in risk-taking caused 
by manipulations of variables of interest within a culture.  However, future 
research should focus on the development of materials that can be used reliably 
across cultures. 
Another important issue is a further examination of the relationship 
between FNE and risk perception.  As discussed, the significant negative 
influence of FNE on perceived risk observed in this study was assumed to be 
due to the relationship between FNE and dialectical reasoning or sensitivity to 
context.  Nonetheless, direct assesses of the relationships were not included 
into this dissertation.  Future study should address this point.  
Also, a scale that measures fear of negative evaluation should be further 
developed.  In this study, FNE scale was used as a manipulation check 
because it was assumed that the FNE manipulation influenced participants’ 
accessibility to their chronic FNE without making differences in their level of 
state anxiety or mood.  We found that eleven items in the scale were sensitive 
to the FNE manipulation.  Therefore, it would be interesting to know whether 
the eleven items were truly sensitive only to individuals’ perceived FNE.  This 
issue is important because a consensus among researchers is that the FNE scale 
measures people’s trait sensitivity to negative evaluation rather than rather than 
their current state.  This assumption is consistent with the belief that one’s fear 
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of negative evaluation is a trait rather than state.  State variables can be easily 
influenced by a simple change in context or manipulation but traits should 
resistant to manipulation.  Thus, there is some question whether FNE scale is 
appropriate to be used as a manipulation check.  Ultimately, this issue could 
be addressed by developing a new scale that truly reflects only one’s sensitivity 
to chronic FNE caused by the FNE manipulation in this study.  For this 
purpose, a further examination of the items, which were observed to be 
sensitive to the FNE manipulation in this study should be carried out.    
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that we induced significant 
differences in risk perception based on a simple manipulation of a participant's 
level of fear of negative evaluation.  As these findings demonstrate, a 
straightforward change in motivational state can lead to a large difference in 
basic cognitive functioning.  This work highlights the need to include more 
research on the influence of motivation on cognitive processing within the 
canon of research in Cognitive Science. 
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5 Appendices 
Appendix 1. Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
For the following statements, please answer each in terms of whether it is true or false for





I rarely worry about seeming foolish to others. R 44 61
I worry about what people will think of me even when I know it doesn’t' make any difference.** 63 36
I become tense and jittery if I know someone is sizing me up.** 60 33
I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavorable impression of me. R  15 25
I feel very upset when I commit some social error. 64 63
The opinions that important people have of me cause me little concern. R 19 16
I am often afraid that I may look ridiculous or make a fool of myself.** 60 28
I react very little when other people disapprove of me. R  27 31
I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings.* 45 27
The disapproval of others would have little effect on me. R   34 31
If someone is evaluating me I tend to expect the worst. 30 26
I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone.** R 18 43
I am afraid that others will not approve of me.* 44 26
I am afraid that people will find fault with me. 50 27
Other people's opinions of me do not bother me. R  18 22
I am not necessarily upset if I do not please someone. R 72 80
When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be thinking about me.  52 38
I feel that you can't help making social errors sometimes, so why worry about it. R   56 55
I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make.** 65 38
I worry a lot about what my superiors think of me. 68 67
If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me. R 21 30
I worry that others will think I am not worthwhile. 31 30
I worry very little about what others may think of me. 32 23
Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me.** 62 37
I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things.** 56 30
I am often indifferent to the opinions others have of me.* R 36 56
I am usually confident that others will have a favorable impression of me. R 77 83
I often worry that people who are important to me won't think very much of me. 35 30
I brood about the opinions my friends have about me. R  34 23
I become tense and jittery if I know I am being judged by my superiors.** 72 37
Note 1. * and ** indicate a significant difference at .05 level and .01 level respectively.
Note 2. The numbers on the right two columns indicate proportion of the “true” response”
for each question.  
Note 3. R indicates a reversed item.  
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Appendix 2. Question set for the measurement of SSSN 
 
How many close friends do you have (people that you feel at ease with, can talk to 
about private matters, and can call on for help)?  
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more
  
 
How may relatives do you have that you feel close to? 
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more 
 
 
With how many members of your family (parents, grandparents, siblings, aunts, uncles, 
cousins, etc.) do you live?  
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more 
 
 
Except for the ones you live with, with how many members of your family do you 
maintain contact (visiting, calling, or writing to them at least once a month)?  
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more 
 
 
Now picture a scale from "1 to 10," where "10" stands for someone who has strong ties 
to his or her local community and would strongly prefer to continue living there, while 
"1" stands for someone without any ties to the local community and would not be sorry 
to move away. Where would you place yourself on that scale? 
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more 
 
 
Picture a scale from "1 to 10," where "10" stands for someone who is very similar to 
each other in his or her local community, while "1" stands for someone without any 
homogeneity with others. Where would you place yourself on that scale? 
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more 
 
 
Picture a scale from "1 to 10," where "10" stands for a local community which is very 
traditional and common, while "1" stands for a local community which is very unusual 
and peculiar. Where would you place your main community on that scale? 
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more 
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How many of people could you approach if you needed financial help or material 
support? 
 
Please circle one:   0    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 or more 
 
 
How many of people could you approach if you needed emotional or psychological 
support? 
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